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Abstract The enduring failure of financial institutions to
identify and deal with risk events continues to have serious
repercussions, whether in the form of small but significant
losses or major and potentially far-reaching scandals.
Using a mixed-methods approach that combines an inno-
vative version of the classic dictator game to inform
prosocial tendencies with the survey-based Theory of
Planned Behaviour, we examine the risk-escalation beha-
viour of individuals within a large financial institution. We
discover evidence of purely selfish behaviour that explains
the lack significance in pressure to adhere to the Subjective
Norms of colleagues around intention to report risks. A
finding that has potentially important implications for
efforts to instil a high-error management climate and
incentivise risk reporting within organisations where risk,
if ignored or unchecked, could ultimately have conse-
quences that extend far beyond the institutions themselves.
Keywords Risk escalation  Dictator game 
Meta-analysis  Error management climate
Introduction
Trader 1: ‘What’s the call on the LIBOR’?
Trader 2: ‘Where would you like it’?
Trader 3: ‘Mixed feelings. But mostly I’d like it all
lower so the world starts to make a little sense’.
Trader 4: ‘The whole HF [hedge fund] world will be
kissing you if LIBOR moves lower’.
Trader 2: ‘Okay, I’ll move the curve down one basis
point—maybe more if I can’.
The above exchange, one of numerous intercepted
interactions central to the high-profile case of traders
manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate, captures
a fundamental truth about financial scandals: in many
instances—arguably in all of them—the responsibility for
reporting bad behaviour rests with the individual. The
scandal, first revealed when Barclays Bank made multiple
criminal settlements in 2012, illustrates the damaging
repercussions of an organisation either failing to receive, or
act upon, reliable information about happenings within its
walls. So, too, do the high-profile controversies associated
with the likes of Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS and the mis-
selling of payment protection insurance (PPI). A contro-
versy that engulfed almost the entire UK financial services
sector and cost the industry billions. By 2014 Lloyds
Banking Group alone had put aside £9.8 billion in com-
pensation to victims of PPI mis-selling, whilst the cost to
the industry in general had spiralled to more than £20
billion by early the same year. Interestingly, in line with
this study, call centre staff were central to what took place.
The sheer preponderance of scandals, in tandem with the
fallout from the crisis, has focused attention on how to
increase the ethical climate of financial services organisa-
tions so as to encourage such internal risk reporting and
reduce the likelihood of further ‘risk events’ (Martin and
Cullen 2006; Gronewold et al. 2013). It is vital that man-
agement obtains reliable and accurate information regard-
ing events, especially errors, within their own organisation
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regardless of whether such events are simple human error,
or intentional actions that could have a harmful impact on
the company. For example, 71% of the banking and finance
industry employees questioned in a recent survey by
KPMG ‘had ‘‘personally seen’’ or had ‘‘first-hand knowl-
edge’’ of categories of misconduct within their organisa-
tions over the prior 12-month period’; moreover, more than
half of these instances concerned ‘misconduct that could
cause a significant loss of public trust if discovered’
(KPMG 2013, pp. 5–6). Such figures justify why the
industry has also been pressurised from both governments
and regulators to increase the robustness of their opera-
tions, increase reporting, reduce risk events and ultimately
improve employee’s ethical behaviour within it. It is
therefore unsurprising that outwardly at least, these
organisations have shown more interest in changing the
way they operate, taking on-board regulation and com-
plying with best practice.
Within financial services, most internal risk reporting
falls under the area of ‘operational riskmanagement’. This is
defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external
events’ (BCBS 2006, p. 79). Much of the research, however,
has not taken place within the financial services industry and
has seen a variety of approaches and definitions within the
ethical literature. For example, Ellis and Arieli (1999) apply
the Theory of Reasoned Action model to investigate inten-
tions to report infractions in a military setting; Kaplan and
Schultz (2007) examine intentions to report questionable
acts; Cassematis and Wortley (2013) explore whistle-
blowing and the non-reporting observer; Mayer et al. (2013)
look into how employers can encourage employees to report
unethical conduct internally; Gronewold et al. (2013) look at
the reporting of self-made errors; and both Morrison (2011)
and Wang and Hsieh (2013) examine the intentional with-
holding of information by employees.
In addition, a variety of theoretical approaches have
been utilised with affective attachments (see Kenny 2014
for a rare banking example,) ethical climate theory and
prosocial behaviour (see Dozier and Miceli 1985; Miceli
et al. 2012; Victor and Cullen 1987; Van Dyck et al. 2005)
all apparent in the literature. The theory of ‘error reporting’
and the ethical dilemmas it causes within organisations is
well established in a number of industries including:
Auditing (Gronewold et al. 2013); Aviation (Catino and
Patriotta 2013) and Health care (Uribe et al. 2002). Such
research has focussed upon particular types of error
reporting, for example: slips and lapses (Leaver and Reader
2016a), self-made errors (Gronewold et al. 2013) and
reporting colleagues (Miller and Thomas 2005). Interest-
ingly, the most recent evidence surrounding error reporting
has taken a human factors approach to investment banking
error reporting (Leaver and Reader 2016a).
This paper takes its cue from error reporting theory and
prosocial organisational behaviour/organisational citizen-
ship (see Brief and Motowidlo 1986; Dozier and Miceli
1985; or more recently Miceli et al. 2012; Biron 2010)
examining incentives to report important information to
higher management. We relax the parameters of which
type of error (risk event) is under investigation, as such we
use the definition of internal operational risk reporting
provided by Bryce et al. (2013, p. 300): ‘the internal pro-
cess by which real or potential risks are reported in a
manner that complies with agreed institutional policy’. It is
important to note that employees use this process in com-
bination with the definition of what operational risk is (as
detailed earlier) as a guide to what should be reported, and
how, during their daily duties. In light of this process and
the organisational norms that are attributed to it, an
employee who fails to report would be deemed to be
behaving in a way that it is morally unacceptable to the
organisation (Trevin˜o et al. 2006). Previous research by
Gronewold et al. (2013) and Taylor and Curtis (2010) has
paved the way for the placement of error reporting climate
within the context of ethical behaviour due to this moral
dilemma of whether to report or not.
The reporting of risk events is key in reducing the
severity of losses through the implementation of controls
and learning from incidents in line with Reason’s (2000)
idea of latent failures. It is also critical to how financial
institutions model their risk losses to the regulator and
maintain financial stability (Bryce et al. 2011). With these
sometimes-competing objectives in mind, financial insti-
tutions have attempted to instil a ‘high-error management’
climate (Gronewold et al. 2013) in which the reporting of
errors (in our case risk events) and the errors themselves
are to be tolerated in an attempt to encourage ethical
behaviour and ongoing error reporting (Van Dyck et al.
2005).
Our approach utilises an incentivised experiment to
analyse an individual’s level of altruism, prosocial beha-
viour and deception. In line with Bryce et al. (2013) we
also employ the Theory of Planned Behaviour to interpret a
survey designed to examine how an individual’s relation-
ship with their work environment influences their intention
to report risk events. The setting for our analysis is a call
centre of a major insurance company. Throughout the
1990s call centres were developed into strategically sig-
nificant distribution vehicles for financial services (Mal-
hotra and Mukherjee 2004). Given this distribution strategy
their staff now often come into contact with real and/or
potential risk events in their very earliest stages and are
likely to be among the very first employees within a
financial services hierarchy to face the choice of reporting a
risk or not. For example, employees in this specific setting
potentially encounter customers attempting to make
C. Bryce et al.
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fraudulent insurance claims or witness a colleague acting
contrary to company policy, that is, moving off script
whilst talking to customers on the phone, as was the case in
PPI mis-selling.
Before explaining our methodology in detail, we offer a
review of the literature on error and risk reporting, error
management climate and individual behaviour in the
workplace. We then extrapolate the literature to the realm
of financial services institutions, examining the worker–
firm relationship, incentives to act and the ethics of risk
reporting.
Literature Review
Risk reporting in the workplace falls within the sphere of
organisational behaviour, taking a multidisciplinary
approach which draws upon applied psychology, sociology
and applied economics (see Trevin˜o et al. 2006; or Miceli
et al. 2012 for an introduction). Past research, much of it
building on the work of Kohlberg (1969) develops theories
based on the notion that individuals bring into the work-
place personal characteristics (e.g. moral awareness and
moral judgment) that affect their behaviour. Victor and
Cullen (1987) argue that these characteristics form the
basis of an ‘organisational ethical climate’, providing a
way in which to understand the reasoning and actions of
employees. Especially relevant in the context of our study
are facet-specific organizational climates (see Kuenzi and
Schminke 2009 for a review) such as how the organisation
itself deals with error reporting. These facet-specific cli-
mates are considered different, albeit related, to the overall
work climate in that they are task (reporting a risk) or
function specific (Schneider 1975).
For example, Martin and Cullen (2006) believe that all
organisations have tangible and intangible norms and that
identification with these norms leads to a shared climate (or
climates) and this shapes the behaviour of individual
employees (see Biron 2010; Peterson 2002; or Reichers and
Schneider 1990). Arnaud and Schminke (2012) refer to a
‘collective moral emotion’ and a ‘collective ethical effi-
cacy’, which Brown et al. (2005) argue are further influ-
enced by the actions and relationships that managers have
with their staff via their day-to-day conduct, personal
actions and relationships—referred to in much of the ethics
literature as situational factors (Trevino 1986; Church et al.
2005).
In addition, employees also bring their own individual
morality and behaviour into the firm and actions are the
result of these two factors: situational and individual,
interacting with each other (see Trevino 1986). Situational
factors affect an employee’s individual sense of right and
wrong when, in our setting, they encounter operational risk
events, and this forms shared beliefs, norms and common
practices regarding the management of error reporting in
the organisation (Van Dyck et al. 2005). Thus, the inter-
action of the situational and the individual can lead an
individual to make a decision to remain silent and ignore
reporting important error events occurring around them
(see Wang and Hsieh 2013) or actually undertaken by them
(see Zhao and Olivera 2006).
Action or inaction is important within a work climate,
where positive action, if viewed favourably by leaders,
might be emulated by other members of a group (Haidt
2000, 2003; Romani and Grappi 2013) as previously dis-
cussed in relation to risk reporting by Bryce et al. (2013).
In addition, Resick et al. (2013) find that ‘deviant’ acts are
more likely to be reported if there is ethical leadership,
whilst Landis et al. (2009) find a positive correlation
between seeing other individuals acting virtuously and
copying their behaviour—an occurrence known in the lit-
erature as ‘moral elevation’. It is the intention of financial
institutions to use this ‘moral elevation’ within a high-error
management climate in order to improve operational risk
reporting. Individual morality can be further disaggregated
as being either: innate pure altruism or a variant, whereby
individuals act in a ‘prosocial’ way with their actions being
neither purely selfish nor purely altruistic.
Individuals who are prosocial can be more influenced by
situational factors than those who are less prosocial, who
instead have selfish tendencies with disregard for the
environment around them (Grant and Berg 2011; Meglino
and Korsgaard 2004). Moreover, individuals with high
prosocial motivation take a more heuristic approach to their
work and are more influenced by the group at the expense
of their own interests (De Cremer and van Lange 2001).
This is particularly pertinent in high-error management
climates, where the ethical dilemma of both acting and
being seen to act might help an individual’s career pro-
spects. Brief and Motowidlo (1986, p. 711) posit that
prosocial behaviour has three facets and is:
• performed by a member of an organisation;
• directed towards an individual, group or organisation
with whom he or she interacts whilst carrying out their
organisational role;
• performed with the intention of promoting the welfare
of the individual, group or organisation towards which
it is directed.
Crucially, these arguments around prosocial behaviour
are in contrast to one of the key assumptions of economic
theory—that individuals invariably seek to maximise their
own utility. As has been highlighted by the likes of Bin-
more (1994, 1998, 1999), Binmore and Shaked (2010),
Hodgson (2012) and Thaler (1987), situational factors are
accorded little (if any) value in the long-standing
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contention that individuals are both rational and selfish. As
such, individuals will prize their own wealth or welfare
above that of others if the rewards are sufficient and there is
no punishment for acting otherwise. This theoretical
understanding of how selfish individuals (call centre staff)
can behave unethically in an attempt to maximise their
wealth was borne out during the PPI mis-selling scandal
due to the inappropriate incentivisation of staff.
In the financial services industry, and more specifically
during the aftermath of the PPI scandal, it was common for
management to impose sanctions for error creation with the
intention of driving future compliant employee behaviour.
Further, the potential costs (reputation, increased effort,
loss of bonus) and negative emotions (fear, embarrassment,
guilt) incurred in self-reporting an event should not be
understated in this climate as highlighted by Zhao and
Olivera (2006). In contrast the facet-specific ‘high-error
management climate’ as posited by Van Dyck et al. (2005)
is typified by open dialogue and communication with
management around errors. This has the benefit of not only
addressing errors in an attempt to correct them, but also in
doing it in a timely manner, by placing less emphasis on
punishment and more on learning from the incident. This
‘time sensitivity’ is particularly poignant in operational risk
events as it is well documented in previous scandals that
the longer a risk is latent (Reason 2000), the more severe
the financial consequences for an institution it becomes, as
was the case in the UBS example mentioned earlier. The
IRM (2012) suggests that the more aligned individual
responses are with an organisation’s principles and values,
the less likely it is that risk events will go unreported.
In contrast, the error reporting literature also argues that
the move to punish, and fear thereof, can be considered as a
characteristic of a facet-specific ‘error-averse management
climate’ which may be counterproductive to the future
reporting of operational risk events (Van Dyck et al. 2005;
Van Dyck 2009; Gronewold et al. 2013; IRM 2012). In
addition, the work of Morrison (2011) introduces the
notion of the futility of expectation, arguing that an insti-
tution will suffer if an individual believes the reporting of
events to be futile, particularly first reports, (see also
Taylor and Curtis 2010; Van Scotter et al. 2005).
Encouragingly, the role of the individual within the
organisational error management climate is also beginning
to be recognised by the financial services industry. The
nomenclature ‘people risk’ being used as a collective term
to capture elements of both the ‘organisational error man-
agement climate’ and ‘ethical climate’ by both industry and
regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority (Bryce
et al. 2013). However, the central issue has proved an
especially difficult one to address effectively given the
constant re-engineering of best practice and compliance
requirements. At present, it appears that there remains a
significant reliance on the individual to do the ‘right thing’,
whether that be in how they conduct themselves or how
they report the misconduct of others. It is also one of the
aims of operational risk managers to avoid employee’s
remaining silent when they observe or commit types of
behaviour not compliant with company policy or wider
regulations, regardless of reason (Pinder and Harlos 2001;
Van Dyne et al. 2003).
Despite this, it is possible to identify key drivers of the
ethical and error management climate within this industry
by drawing on the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA)
publication of ‘Final Notices’. These notices are issued to
institutions that have failed to adhere to the Principles of
Business laid out by the FCA. They provide detailed
independent documentation as to how these risk events
have occurred and the reasons behind such failures. Given
the sensitivity and financial severity of such failures, it is
difficult to obtain such forensic information from the public
domain. The use of these notices as a data source for
forensic content analysis has recently been employed by
Ring et al. (2014) when discussing the concept of risk
culture and Ashton (2014) in relation to financial mis-
selling.
We can usefully frame such an analysis by observing a
small number of simple prerequisites. Each event must
have:
• arisen from a ‘common’ people-risk issue
• resulted in a fine of more than £1 million
• taken place within a large institution.
Applying these criteria, we see that most cases revolve
around a failure on the part of managers to put in place an
adequate risk management system. This absence of con-
trols appears to create problems around risk reporting, as
even if the ethical and error management climate are
strong, the infrastructure surrounding the organisation may
make the reporting of risk events debilitating for an
employee due to the sheer prevalence of real/potential risk
events. As Table 1 illustrates, this is further exacerbated by
many of the cases (61% in total) citing insufficient or
inappropriate training and skills as a contributory factor in
the development and manifestation of risk within the
organisation. This lack of training has been highlighted in
previous research to not only negatively affect risk
reporting (Bryce et al. 2016), but it has also been high-
lighted by Leaver and Reader (2016a) in the creation of
risks at the operational level of an investment bank.
This rather worrying statistic around training only acts
to reinforce the previous work of Bryce et al. 2013 and
Power et al. (2013) as employees (no matter how intrinsi-
cally motivated to report) may simply not realise that what
they have witnessed or done is worthy of escalating or
worse, that it is their responsibility to do so (Leaver and
C. Bryce et al.
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Reader 2016a). This is pertinent to the operational risk
discipline as unlike credit and market risk, every employee
(regardless of role) has the potential to be exposed, or
expose the organisation, to operational risk within their
work environment. This has led the financial institution
under investigation to employ a very basic risk readiness
mantra of ‘see something, say something’ through contin-
ual professional development and introductory courses in
operational risk for all employees during induction. How-
ever, given the broad scope of professions within a finan-
cial institution it must be noted that the influence of
professional identity (Taylor and Curtis 2010) has yet to be
considered in operational risk reporting and may actually
be a weakness in the reporting process currently, as so
many backgrounds and professions are responsible for
reporting. This concept of professional identity is particu-
larly important for the subject group under investigation as
their profession (call-handler) has little by way of profes-
sional memberships or external accreditation. Although
Table 1 provides a snapshot of the importance of the
individual in dealing with risk events, the significance of
the relationships and influences between financial services
employees and their institutions has been the subject of
little research (see McCabe 2009 Kenny 2014; Leaver and
Reader 2016a, b).
In the context of our paper, we are interested in the
organisational error management climate, how organisa-
tions react to operational risk events when reported, and
how these reactions affect employee’s intention to act
morally and report future risk events as they arise. The
financial services industry is still coming to terms with the
day-to-day relevance of operational risk, especially with
regards internal risk reporting. Operational risk remains
commonly viewed as something to be observed—chiefly in
the interests of complying with regulations (see Bryce et al.
2011; or Palermo et al. 2016). A KPMG survey of 500
senior managers involved in risk management within
financial institutions reported that only 42% planned to
make fundamental changes to their processes, ‘suggesting a
degree of complacency’ (KPMG 2009, p. 5) in processes of
their organisational error management climate.
All of which provides the basis for our method which is
not entirely without precedent as work by Ellis and Arieli
(1999) examined intentions to report infractions utilising
the Theory of Reasoned Action. Our approach will enable
us to (1) examine the level of prosocial behaviour involved
in the decision to report risk events within a financial
institution, (2) identify links with individual’s perceptions
of the institution, (3) determine the prevalence of a high-
error management climate or error-averse climate and (4)
observe employee deception towards colleagues. For
example, if we find high levels of prosocial behaviour in
our experiment, we envisage this would lead to more
positive results regarding intention to report, an indicator of
a high-error management climate.
Our use of an adapted form of the dictator game in
combination with the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen
1988, 1991) extends the work of Bryce et al. (2013). The
rationale for using intention to report operational risk is
embedded in the ‘see something, say something’ mantra of
risk awareness and anticipation outlined by the institution
under investigation (Rybowiak et al. 1999; Zhao and
Olivera 2006). Further, given the limited time afforded to
the research team to enter the organisation and investigate
their employees it was not feasible to monitor risk report-
ing behaviour directly given the timeframes and access
required to conduct an ontological study. A more detailed
psychological rationale for the use of intention as a pre-
dictor of behaviour is detailed below.
Methodology and Hypothesis Development
Our analysis of internal risk reporting within a financial
institution was carried out at a site responsible for more
than £45 million in turnover for the period 2012–2013. Our
mixed-methods approach consisted of two modules;
Module 1—a derivation of the classic ‘Dictator Game’
Table 1 FSA Final Notices 2006–2011. Source: Authors own calculations derived from FSA Final Notices
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
No. of cases that met criteria 10 8 5 8 10 10 51
No. of cases in retail sector 7 8 4 1 4 8 32
Value of £ fine
(% of total for year—all fines)
4.97 m
(37%)
4.45 m
(83%)
15.94 m
(70%)
28.32 m
(81%)
69.32 m
(78%)
52.16 m
(80%)
206.84 m
(89%)
Breach of principle 2 7 2 1 3 2 0 15
Specific mention of breach of principle 3 10 8 4 8 7 5 42
Specific mention of breach of principle 9 0 1 1 0 0 4 6
Specific mention of breach of principle 6 and 7 5 4 3 1 1 0 14
Specific mention of lack of training as an issue 6 6 4 7 2 9 34
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economic experiment and Module 2—the survey-based
‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’. This integration of eco-
nomic experiments and survey-based elicitation techniques
to gain additional insights into elements of ethical climate,
error-climate and prosocial behaviour in our study has seen
a steady rise in popularity within the literature. Recent
examples of this approach include the study of risk pref-
erences (Fehr et al. 2003; Dohmen et al. 2011), organisa-
tional whistle-blowing (Burks and Krupka 2012), trust
(Naef and Schupp 2009) and personality (Ben-Ner et al.
2004). In this current study, setting the inference of beha-
viour via surveys and observation of behaviour via exper-
iments provides a complementary approach to the
understanding of internal risk reporting within a large
financial services organisation.
Module 1: The Adapted Dictator Game
The dictator game is a well-known behavioural economics
experiment that tests altruistic and prosocial behaviour
(Kahneman et al. 1986; Forsythe et al. 1994; Bardsley
2008; Eckel and Grossmann 1996; Dana et al. 2006). In the
classic dictator game, a first player the ‘dictator’ is required
to determine how to split an allocation of money with a
second player the ‘recipient’. The recipient simply receives
the amount the dictator chooses not to claim; the recipi-
ent’s role is therefore completely passive. The game is
most commonly acted out as a one-off interaction, with no
scope for role reversal or repeated plays based on gained
information. If individuals were wholly rational and
motivated purely by their own welfare, as suggested by
classical economic theory, ‘dictators’ would keep the entire
allocation for themselves and send nothing to recipients.
For our version of the dictator game we prepared 90
envelopes containing eight £1 coins (£8) and 10 envelopes
containing four £1 coins and four chocolate coins (£4 ? 4).
All of the envelopes were placed in a box, and each subject
was asked to remove one at random. Subjects were advised
of the two types of envelopes but not of the 90/10 split. In
contrast to Ben-Ner et al. (2004), we did not allow
reciprocity and played the game without role reversal.
Each subject was asked to open their chosen envelope,
examine the contents and decide how much to keep and
how much to send to a colleague in another call centre. The
allocation to be sent to the ‘recipient’ was then resealed in
the envelope and placed in a second box. We placed the
two boxes in a separate room to ensure subjects behaviour
was private and anonymous which is common practice for
experiments dealing with unethical behaviour (Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013). The sent funds would be used to
buy coffee (in line with Khadjavi and Lange 2013) by the
‘recipient’ in a sister call centre. To this extent, our game
essentially mirrored the original dictator game.
However, we introduced the possibility of deception by
placing next to the second box a jar containing 500
chocolate coins. Each ‘dictator’ was free to put chocolate
coins into their envelope (in the case of a (£4 ? 4)
envelope being selected, of course, a ‘dictator’ could also
remove chocolate coins from their envelope). This allowed
them to pretend to have drawn a (£4 ? 4) envelope by
giving the ‘receiver’ an impression of having behaved
fairly and shared equally, when in reality they had drawn a
cash-only (£8) envelope and kept three quarters of the
money. A similar experimental set-up (albeit using the
ultimatum game) was first introduced by Guth et al. (1996)
in which ‘dictators’, who in the context of our study
received the larger envelope (£8), sent the fair offer of the
(£4 ? 4) envelope, to maximise their profits and to dis-
guise the true size of their initial envelope. This modifi-
cation enabled us not only to observe incidents of unethical
behaviour in the form of deception but to measure
selfishness, prosocial and altruistic behaviour (Hoffman
et al. 1994; Engel 2011). Further, the use of chocolate coins
by subjects to replace real money and deceive their coun-
terparts will also provide an experimental indication of the
ethical climate and prevalence towards ‘covering up’
which typifies an error-averse organisation.
Although in our experiment all decisions were made in
isolation in a separate room, with no means of tracing them
back to subjects, they were told there was a 2% chance that
the original value of an envelope would be revealed. This
was not an arbitrary figure: it was provided by the insti-
tution as the percentage of financial products mis-sold each
month and was therefore representative of identifiable risk
events that would require reporting. Our intention here was
to suggest that deception might be detected, providing a
real and obvious threat. This ‘reveal’ mimics the real-life
work environment within the call centre as employees in
contact with regulated financial products have their calls
recorded with monthly reviews of their adherence to
institutional policies.
What should we expect to find? The unflinching
rationality championed by textbook economic theory
would see dictators keep everything and give nothing
(Binmore 1994), but the results ought to be somewhat less
straightforward if we take into consideration the environ-
ment in which these subjects will be situated. As Engel
stated in his meta-study (n = 616) of the dictator game
(2011, p. 584):
While normally a sizeable fraction of participants
does indeed give nothing, as predicted by the payoff
maximisation hypothesis, only very rarely has this
been the majority choice. It is by now undisputed that
human populations are systematically more benevo-
lent than homo economicus.
C. Bryce et al.
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In other words, purely selfish behaviour tends to be
discovered but is by no means the norm. Engel reports that
‘dictators’ are more likely to give a little than a lot—on
average sending ‘recipients’ 28.35% of the available
total—but in only six of 616 treatments surveyed do they
give an average of zero. Importantly, though, most
experiments based on the dictator game have not been
carried out in a corporate setting. Comparing our results
with Engel’s meta-study should therefore shed light on the
levels of individual morality and the influence of situa-
tional pressures to act ethically within the workplace.
Module 2: The Intention to Report Operational Risk
Events Survey
All 62 of the employees who took part in the adapted
dictator game also took part in our survey, which was again
carried out in isolation and away from fellow employees
and members of the research team. The sample was almost
equally split between male and female staff and dominated
by customer-facing employees and risk managers; over
half of the subjects had been at the institution for more than
three years. Descriptive information on the respondents is
provided in Table 2.
Structuring questions pseudo-randomly to minimise
respondent bias, we used seven-point Likert scales that
invited responses ranging from ‘strongly agree’ (?3) to
‘strongly disagree’ (-3). Please see ‘Appendix 3’ for items
used in this survey. Analysis was carried out using PASW
version 18, with regression analysis used to assess the
relevance of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen
1988, 1991). The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)
disaggregates an individual’s behavioural Intentions (INT)
into three antecedents:
• Attitude (ATT)—the individual’s attitude towards the
behaviour
• Subjective Norm (SN)—a measure of the perceived
degree of pressure from surrounding sources
• Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)—the perception
of control over the final outcome of the behaviour.
These three variables combine to influence a subject’s
intention (Dennison and Shepherd 1995) to report risk
events. The use of intention as a predictor of behaviour is
grounded in the psychological literature and conceptual
frameworks that develop it such as the Theory of Reasoned
Action, Theory of Planned Behaviour and Technology
Acceptance Model. Intention is considered a strong indi-
cator of actual behaviour in various settings including job
seeking behaviour, smoking cessation and technology
uptake (Ajzen 1988, 1991, Bryce et al. 2013; Hsu and Chiu
2004; Lin 2010). In this current setting, the intention to
report is central to the error management climate within the
organisation as Van Dyck et al. (2005) state that commu-
nication about errors constitutes the most important error
management practice. The three antecedents correspond
closely with the idea that actions and responses are the
result of the interaction between the individual and the
situational (Trevino 1986) and that behaviour within
organisations is at least in some way influenced by an
amalgamation of individual morality, collective moral
emotion and work climate (Kish-Gephart et al. 2010).
ATT acts to determine an individual’s beliefs around the
behaviour in question. For our purposes, it indicates whe-
ther some individual thinks reporting a risk event is
worthwhile. We expect that ATT will be influenced by a
combination of individual prosocial behaviour, ethical
climate, error-climate and perceived significance of the
event itself. In essence, the individual needs to be con-
vinced that an event is important and requires reporting.
SN relates to the social pressure to report a risk event. This
pressure might come from the members of an individual’s
team, from line managers or from regulators. It is directly
linked to the idea of embedded notions of behaviour within
a financial services organisation, as discussed in Ring et al.
(2014). As explained earlier, groups within organisations
identify with norms, giving rise to a shared climate (Re-
ichers and Schneider 1990) and producing an environment
that influences the conduct of individual staff members.
SN has been found to be significant in intention to report
(more so than ATT) in related work, albeit in a different
institutional setting (the Israeli Defence Forces, see Ellis
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of respondents
Characteristic Frequency %
Gender
Male 34 54.8
Female 28 45.2
Role within the institution
Customer facing 38 61.3
Manager/team leader 8 12.9
Risk manager 16 25.8
Length of time at the institution
0\ 6 months 4 6.5
6 months C 1 year 9 14.5
1 Year[ 3 years 17 27.4
3 years C 5 years 11 17.7
5 years? 21 33.9
Length of time in current role
0\ 6 months 8 12.9
6 months C 1 year 10 16.1
1 year[ 3 years 24 38.7
3 years C 5 years 7 11.3
5 years? 13 21.0
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and Arieli 1999). In contrast, Bryce et al. (2013) report SN
to be insignificant, this may be due to a lack of awareness
or the ethical climate of those working in financial insti-
tutions. Work by Moosa (2007), Power (2007) and Hain
(2009) argues that reporting misconduct in financial insti-
tutions might be constrained by various factors, including a
disruptive environment (e.g. a blame culture), a financial
penalty on the institution, or fear of discrimination by
colleagues. All of which can be attributed to characteristics
of an averse-error management climate (Van Dyck et al.
2005). In contrast, recent regulatory requirements imply
that line managers should react positively to the escalation
of risk events in line with the characteristics of a high-error
management climate.
PBC represents an individual’s perceptions of seeing
actions through to a successful conclusion which may not
necessarily be as easy as first thought given the lack of
action taken by early whistle-blowers as indicated by Van
Scotter et al. (2005). This variable is again linked to
interactions within the work climate in which employees
find themselves. Venkatesh and Brown (2001) and Pavlou
and Fygenson (2006) indicate that ‘ease of use affects the
control an employee believes he or she has over reporting
an event, whilst Arnaud and Schminke (2012, p. 1768)
note:
Members of a work unit may know the right thing to
do, but if they feel confident in their collective ability
to bring about the desired outcome they are more
likely to follow through with doing it.
Arnaud and Schminke (2012), like Bandura (1986) before
them, also highlight the significance of ‘self-efficacy’,
which for our purposes relates to the competence of staff to
report risk events. Other studies, among them Eden and
Aviram (1993), Saks and Ashforth (2000), Ma and Liu
(2005) and Chan and Lu (2004) endorse this theme.
Accordingly, we consider ‘self-efficacy’ and ‘ease of use’
within the PBC construct whilst keeping in mind the
outcomes of our initial investigation of Final Notices,
which highlighted the ineffectiveness of the risk manage-
ment system, which in part entails the ‘ease of use’ of the
risk reporting process.
Given the above, our first three hypotheses apply those
of Ajzen (1991) via the prism of the specific setting of our
study. They are as follows:
H1 ATT positively affects intention to escalate opera-
tional risk events
H2 SN positively affects intention to escalate operational
risk events
H3 PBC positively affects intention to escalate opera-
tional risk events
In an effort to help explain the variance in behavioural
intention, we further adapt the TPB to include additional
variables beyond those originally proposed by Ajzen
(1988). The openness of the TPB to the inclusion of further
explanatory variables is considered key to this current
study. The role of ‘uncertainty’, as considered by Bryce
et al. (2016) is one of these additional antecedents. It has
been shown that education and training can alleviate
uncertainty, with employees gaining more understanding of
their roles and responsibilities and developing their ability
to identify potential risk events (Power 2005; Mikes and
Kaplan 2013; IRM 2012; Leaver and Reader 2016a).
However, our initial investigation of the Final Notices in
Sect. 2.1 highlighted that the majority of cases included
insufficient or inappropriate training and skills of
employees. This makes it difficult for them to be certain
that a real or potential risk event had occurred and what to
do should they realise, relating back to the concept of risk
awareness and readiness that the organisation under
investigation was striving for. This leads us to the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H4 Uncertainty negatively affects intention to escalate
operational risk events
We also examine the intrinsic motivation of employees
to report risks and the importance of their decision to
engage or disengage with the work environment’s proto-
cols and procedures, as per the norms referred to by Martin
and Cullen (2006) and more specifically Van Dyck et al.
(2005). It may be, for example, that members of staff who
fully reflect on the reporting process and value their own
track records in risk management have a stronger intention
towards the reporting of risk events, a view closely linked
to the characteristics previously discussed of a high-error
management climate. This is closely linked with and adds
further support to PBC, in that an employee who under-
stands structures and protocols will have more knowledge
about the level (or probability) of his or her control over the
ultimate outcome. This brings us to our final hypothesis:
H5 An employee’s risk integrity positively affects
intention to escalate operational risk events
Results and Discussion
Module 1 Results: The Adapted Dictator Game
A total of 62 subjects played our adapted version of the
dictator game. Of these, 55 ‘dictators’ picked a cash-only
envelope (£8) and seven picked a cash/chocolate envelope
(£4 ? 4). Figure 1 shows the variance in decision-making
of gift amounts sent to the ‘recipient’ for those ‘dictators’
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who picked the (£8) cash-only envelopes. Twenty-four of
the fifty-five ‘dictators’ in this treatment (44%) kept all the
money for themselves. The figure is higher than the aver-
age reported by the meta-study conducted by Engel (2011),
who found around 36% of ‘dictators’ give nothing, and
more closely corresponds with the theoretical literature of
pay-off rationality. It also suggests the 2% probability of
the original sum being revealed to the ‘recipient’ had
minimal influence on behaviour for these subjects.
As well as fitting the notion of the economic agent as
maximiser (Binmore 1994, 1998, 1999; Binmore and
Shaked 2010; Hodgson 2012; Thaler 1987), this result
helps interpret the two dimensions of the dictator game
explored in the literature—one asserting that behaviour is
universal, the other examining the effect of situational
circumstances (Trevino 1986). Our finding shows that
employees in financial institutions are more likely than on
average to take everything, thus exhibiting more purely
selfish behaviour than the general population.
We do, though, also find some evidence of altruistic/
prosocial behaviour. Eleven of the fifty-five subjects (22%)
who picked a (£8) cash-only envelope favoured an equal
split, keeping £4 for themselves and gifting the remaining
£4. This is in line with purely altruistic and prosocial
behaviour, with the latter an adapted form of altruism in
which positive social behaviour does not solely benefit
others but also rewards the individual (Falk et al. 2003;
Church et al. 2005).
This, too, is an important finding, as it has been argued
that prosocial behaviour must be present in some form for
an individual to report a risk event and to create a high-
error management climate (Dozier and Miceli 1985, Van
Dyck et al. 2005). Interestingly, Engel (2011) finds that on
average around 17% choose an equal split—somewhat less
than we find in our environmental setting. It is possible that
some kind of situational pressure may be at play, which
further highlights the value of conducting our experiments
in situ. In addition to this, given the experiment was run in
the work environment, and the fact that ‘receiver’ is a
colleague in a sister call centre, it may engender beliefs of
team membership and citizenship. Previous research sug-
gests higher cooperation rates when we look at other
studies conducted in team and group environments, for
example Goette et al. (2006) show a higher cooperation
rate when subjects are paired with a member of their own
group in the prisoners’ dilemma. This is also supported by
Chmura et al. (2016) in which group members have more
trust and higher beliefs of reciprocity when paired with a
subject from the same community. Our findings also sup-
port the work of Landis et al. (2009) who introduced the
notion of moral elevation, that is, a positive correlation
between seeing other individuals acting virtuously and
copying their behaviour.
Evidence of altruism in its purest sense (Leeds 1963),
whereby the ‘dictator’ receives no gain whatsoever, is also
witnessed, with 10 of the 55 subjects (18%) who picked the
(£8) cash-only envelope keeping nothing. This result is
much higher than the average for studies of this type, the
Engel (2011) meta-study of 616 treatments only finds an
average of just 5%, taken with the levels of prosocial
behaviour already reported, this result further adds to the
notion that individuals may be reacting to situational
pressures in the workplace. It is worth noting that the lit-
erature indicates such altruism is more evident if money is
to be sent to colleagues or charitable institutions. As such,
individual and situational factors may be combining (Wang
and Hsieh 2013), this was also found in the work of
Chmura et al. (2010) where a higher altruism rate is also
observed for prisoners from the same correctional facility.
In the context of our study, the work environment stimu-
lates a ‘team spirit’ that leads employees to feel closer to
each other compared to other randomly matched subjects in
other studies. Overall, employees who picked the (£8)
cash-only envelopes sent 35% of the total available money
to receivers—again a figure higher than reported in Engel’s
(2011) meta-study (28%).
In summary, as Fig. 1 illustrates, our financial institution
produces results that are three-peaked for those who ran-
domly chose the cash-only (£8) envelope. Although indi-
vidual pay-off maximisation dominates, employees who
choose to give some portion of the money exhibit more
prosocial behaviour than on average for this game. This
illustrates the influence of situational factors combining
with individual traits. Those 44% who kept all the money
for themselves demonstrate lower prosocial motivation and
greater rationality in the textbook economics sense and
may be ignoring influences such as reporting policies, work
climate and collective moral emotion (Meglino and Kors-
gaard 2006; Simon 1993) in their duties.
Fig. 1 Distribution of coins left in envelopes (subjects who initially
received eight £1 coins)
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As shown in Table 3 and Fig. 2, analysis of how those
subjects who picked cash-only envelopes (£8) used the
chocolate coins also reveals a three-peaked distribution.
Nearly 30% chose not to put any chocolate coins back in the
envelope, thus showing no intention to deceive their recip-
ient colleagues; almost 24% filled the envelope with eight
chocolate coins, indicating not only pay-off maximisation
but little prosocial behaviour and no apparent willingness to
conceal their actions; and 27% placed either four or six
chocolate coins in the envelope. This indicates that indi-
vidual factors are at play, and that employees will bring their
own moral and ethical behaviour into the institution. As all
employees in the subject pool are working under the same
facet-specific ethical and error-climate—our results provide
evidence of a diverse level of individual morality and ethical
behaviour within the workforce.
This is further evidenced by the last of these peaks, which
suggests a desire to deceive the ‘recipient’ by appearing to
act in their interest. Placing four chocolate coins in the
envelope indicates at least a measure of deception, as it
might lead the ‘receiver’ to believe a cash/chocolate
envelope was originally picked. Placing six chocolate coins
in the envelope—surprisingly, a ploy chosen by only one
subject—indicates total deception, the hope being that the
receiver concludes that a cash/chocolate envelope was
originally picked and the money was split evenly. Overall,
almost half of the subjects who picked cash-only envelopes
(46%) removed all or some of the money and used chocolate
coins to restore the eight-coin total.
The use of chocolate coins to deceive is most apparent
among those subjects who picked cash/chocolate envel-
opes. Although the small number of respondents who
selected these envelopes does not necessarily lend itself to
establishing reliable trends, it is possible to discern purely
selfish behaviour and attempted deception, since three
subjects (43%) took all the money and left the four
chocolate coins; as Table 4 shows, no two of the remaining
four subjects took the same course as each other.
Taking these results as a whole, the key point is that all
three types of behaviour—selfish, altruistic and prosocial—
are clearly in evidence and higher than the average
reported by Engel’s (2011) meta-study of the dictator
game. The question is whether this is a consequence of the
influence exerted by our chosen setting of a financial
institution. It is apparent that a large proportion of the
subjects have no issue with covering up, and deceiving
colleagues with chocolate coins, even with the existence of
a real threat. This may be indicative of their lack of
intention to report errors, particularly those errors that may
involve financial loss for themselves in reporting. To
examine these findings in more detail whilst applying the
lens of error management climate we turn to the Theory of
Planned Behaviour.
Module 2 Results: The Intention to Report
Operational Risks Survey
Previous research suggests that the findings from our
adapted dictator game could inform each of our TPB
variables—Attitude (ATT), Subjective Norm (SN) and
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)—especially given
the contention that behaviour within organisations is at
least in some way influenced by a combination of indi-
vidual morality, collective moral emotion and work climate
(Kish-Gephart et al. 2010). Since TPB is particularly
dependent on the interaction of individual and situational
Table 3 Distribution of coins left in envelopes
Coins of type remaining in the envelope
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Employees selecting envelope with 4 £1 coins and 4 £1 choc coins
£1 chocolate coins found in the envelope 1 – – – 5 – – 1 –
£1 coins found in the envelope 3 1 – 1 2 – – – –
Employees selecting envelope with 8 £1 coins
£1 chocolate coins found in the envelope (no £1 coins) 16 1 5 1 15 0 1 3 13
£1 coins found in the envelope (no chocolate coins) 24 2 2 3 11 1 2 0 10
Fig. 2 Deceptive use of chocolate coins? (All other possible
combinations had a frequencyB 3) (subjects who initially received
eight £1 coins)
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factors within an organisation, our finding that purely
selfish behaviour dominates both purely altruistic and
prosocial behaviour could be significant.
Table 5 presents the results of our Pearson correlations,
including means, standard deviations and Cronbach alpha,
for all constructs within the study. The original aspects of
TPB are all significantly and positively associated with each
other, with all other constructs also significantly associated
with Intention (INT). Given the importance of, and
requirement for, communication in a high-error manage-
ment climate in which latent errors are prevalent, it is
reassuring to see a positive INT scale average of 5.828,
stronger than previous studies in a similar environment
(Bryce et al. 2013). Interestingly, the strongest correlation is
PBC with INT (r = 0.627), which, whilst not conclusive,
provides some evidence of the assertion of Arnaud and
Schminke (2012) that confidence of achieving a desired
outcome affects behaviour. In line with the work of Bryce
et al. (2016), uncertainty is negatively associated with both
INT and ATT, thus confirming the robustness of our variable
selections. Adequate internal reliability is present, as indi-
cated by the Cronbach alpha values in the bottom row of the
table (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994; Cronbach 1970).
A four-stage hierarchical regression model was used to
analyse the TPB and test for any significant causal effects
of our constructs. Table 6 shows the results. Model 1,
which includes the three basic variables making up TPB, is
significant (F(3.58) = 18.482, p\ 0.001), with the adjus-
ted r2 explaining 46% of the variance in INT. The results
show that ATT towards escalating a risk event and PBC
over the final outcome of such a course of action are both
positive and significant, indicating the presence of the
characteristics of a high-error management work climate in
our financial institution such as the positive link between
attitudes (behaviours) towards, and commitment. To
organisational goals (reporting) thus allowing us to accept
H1 and H3. This alignment of organisational goals and
reporting (particularly detection) by employees was high-
lighted by Roberts and Bea (2001) during their seminal
study of high reliability organisations. These findings
highlight two important points. The first is that an indi-
vidual who chooses to report a risk event must believe that
doing so is worthwhile and relate to a larger organisation
strategy. The second is that an individual who chooses to
report a risk event must believe that doing so will be both
productive and straightforward.
Broadly in line with the work of the IRM (2012), these are
key considerations in attempts to devise and implement
policies that encourage risk reporting within organisations.
Further, the importance of learning from incidents to the
organisation as explained in the induction courses for all new
members of staff (both in terms of why employees should,
and the outcomes from the reporting behaviour) serves to
satisfy both these points. This highlights the importance of an
effective risk management system, in which the reporting
process resides, as detailed in our analysis of the Final
Notices and typifies the characteristics of a high-error man-
agement climate within the institution under investigation.
Further, in line with Bryce et al. (2013) but in contrast to
the work of Ellis and Arieli (1999) and (with a little knowing
extrapolation) to the work ofMiceli et al. (2012) SN is found
to be insignificant. The models show that the influence of
others—for example, the ‘team’ is inconsequential, we
therefore reject H2. This may appear a surprising finding,
but it is one onwhich the results of our adapted dictator game
shed some light. As reported above, the literature suggests
prosocial individuals are more influenced by situational
factors than those who exhibit selfishness, who instead tend
to disregard their environment and those around them and
value their own opinions above those of others (Grant and
Berg 2011; Meglino and Korsgaard 2004). Our survey poses
Table 4 Subject randomly selecting 4/4 split envelopes
£1 coins remaining/chocolate coins remaining Frequency
0/4 3
1/7 1
3/4 1
4/0 1
4/4 1
Table 5 Pearson correlations
between survey items
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Intention
2. Attitude 0.470**
3. Subjective Norm 0.483** 0.405**
4. Perceived Behavioural Control 0.627** 0.326** 0.481**
5. Uncertainty -0.608** -0.350** -0.337** -0.529**
6. Risk integrity 0.448** 0.156 0.120 0.273* 0.434**
Mean 5.828 6.182 5.431 5.362 2.860 4.328
SD 0.806 0.634 0.911 0.970 1.095 0.916
Cronbach alpha 0.81 0.66 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.68
** Correlation significant p\ 0.01, * Correlation significant p\ 0.05
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specific questions regarding others’ views of reporting risk
events, and these may be dismissed by the purely selfish who
make-up nearly half of our subjects. This again points
towards the intention to report a risk event being reliant on
the attitude of the individual towards the event itself and the
ability of the individual to perceive control over the path to a
positive outcome. Further, the lack of a professional body to
provide an identity, and guidance on best practice for the call
centre staff over and above what the organisation itself is
instilling may hinder the effects of SN on intention to report
risk events. The work of Taylor and Curtis (2010) and
Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) has highlighted the impor-
tance professional identity has on maintaining professional
standards and the perceptions of responsibility in reporting.
We now turn to our final two hypotheses in Table 6, the
variables for both ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk integrity’ are
positive and significant across the models in which they are
included. The results of Model 3 (F(6.55) = 13.576,
p\ 0.001) allow us to accept both H4 and H5. Regarding
H4, we find higher levels of certainty are positively related
to intention to report risk events. This provides further
evidence that training increases certainty, enhances an
individual’s attitude towards reporting an event and gen-
erates confidence in the knowledge that (a) the process of
reporting will itself be straightforward and (b) the organi-
sation will respond positively. Well-trained employees
become more informed in making valid judgments;
importantly, they may also be more likely to dismiss col-
leagues’ opinions when they intuitively ‘know’ their
intention to report an event is right. This adds more weight
to the importance of training for situational factors within a
high-error management climate, particularly given how
significant an individual perceives an event to be, and their
confidence of being able to see it through to a successful
conclusion are related to reporting intention.
The supporting of H5 is also in line with the notion that
control in seeing the reporting of a risk event through to an
effective resolution may be key. We take this as further
robust testing of PBC and additional evidence of a link
between intention to report and protocols and procedures
within the work environment. As per Martin and Cullen
(2006), this demonstrates that employees who fully reflect
on the reporting process and, based on this knowledge, can
calculate the chances of success are more likely to escalate
risk events. Although specific to the investment bank
domain this result resonates with the ‘Situation Awareness’
and ‘Decision Making’ non-technical skills required by
financial traders as outlined by Leaver and Reader (2016a,
p. 714) in reporting risk events.
Our results also concur with Trevin˜o et al. (2006) and
Kohlberg (1969), who posit that individuals bring personal
characteristics such as moral awareness and moral judg-
ment into the workplace and that perceptions of the ethical
work climate impact on behaviour in institutions where
there is a tendency towards selfishness. However, this
effect is not unidirectional, we also witness the effect that
the error management climate has on the risk reporting
intention of employees. In line with Brown et al. (2005),
Van Dyck et al. (2005) and Leaver and Reader, (2016a), we
find clear structures, processes and leadership to be influ-
ential. This also lends weight to the suggestion that leaders,
through their own conduct, can shape the actions of indi-
viduals in high-error management climates; and to the
argument that situational factors such as promotion and
remuneration policies should remain consistent (Trevino
1986; Church et al. 2005), thus further encouraging com-
pliant behaviour. What we do not discover is evidence of
the formation of pressures to report due to the norms of
reporting by peers that influence behaviour or a shared
identity into which individuals attempt to fit (Reichers and
Schneider 1990).
Conclusion
The dramatic events of recent years have starkly underlined
the fashionable dictum that banks and other financial insti-
tutions are ‘too big to fail’. Of course, the true message
behind this maxim is that they cannot be allowed to fail; and
yet the irony is that in reality they fail again and again. They
fail on a very fundamental level whenever a risk event goes
unreported or unchecked; and, as we have seen, it is the
individual who is usually—if not always—presented with an
opportunity to block the path towards potential catastrophe.
There is literally no telling what might happen if and
when an individual chooses not to act in these circum-
stances. As stated at the outset, the consequences might
take the form of small but significant losses or major and
far-reaching scandals. In all likelihood, depending on
seriousness, there will be some cost to the relevant
Table 6 Results of multivariate regression analysis
Model 1b 2b 3b
Attitude 0.253* 0.229* 0.192*
Subjective Norm 0.154 0.167 0.152
Perceived Behavioural Control 0.470** 0.395** 0.310**
Risk integrity 0.285** 0.214*
Uncertainty -0.233*
R2 0.489 0.563 0.596
Adj R2 0.462*** 0.533*** 0.560***
Sig F change 0.000 0.003 0.038
Examination of tolerance, VIF and condition indices indicated no
violations of multicollinearity or collinearity for all elements in the
table
*** p\ 0.0001; ** p\ 0.001; * p\ 0.05
C. Bryce et al.
123
institution, to the industry as a whole or to the wider
economy and those who exist within it.
The above offers a sobering context in which to consider
both the consequences of inaction and the implications of our
findings. To put the matter bluntly: there is invariably a price
to pay for failing to report a risk event, and the price is
sometimes extraordinarily high. The Financial Conduct
Authority Final Notices that provided the foundations for our
study highlight how a lack of management and control, an
absence of adequate risk management systems and poor
training are frequently at the root of the decision not to
escalate a risk event. With this in mind, the central goal of our
research was to deliver a more comprehensive understanding
of individual behaviour and the reporting of risk within a
financial institution. Building on the work of Bryce et al.
(2013), we used a mixed-methods approach, combining an
innovative version of the classic dictator game with the
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), to test for levels of
prosocial behaviourwhilst examining intentions to report risk.
Our adapted dictator game produced a three-peaked
distribution of results. Significantly, levels of purely self-
ish, purely altruistic and prosocial behaviour were all
higher than the averages reported by Engel (2011) in his
meta-study of dictator games. Most importantly, of the
three, it was purely selfish behaviour that dominated.
Our subsequent application of TPB produced results
broadly in line with Bryce et al. (2013). Two of the prin-
cipal variables of TPB—Attitude (ATT) and Perceived
Behavioural Control (PBC)—were found to significantly
influence intention to report a risk event, whereas the third,
Subjective Norm (SN), was found to be surprisingly
insignificant (in contrast to Ellis and Arieli 1999). How-
ever, this may make sense: the purely selfish dominated our
adapted dictator game, and those whose behaviour is purely
selfish will tend to value their own ideas and opinions
above those of others.
Such individuals have a clear notion of whether a risk
event should be reported. For them it is vital that (a) they
believe the event to be important (ATT) and (b) they feel
confident in their ability to see the issue through to a
successful conclusion (PBC). This being the case, it fol-
lows that management should be aware of such tendencies
and should devise and implement risk reporting policies
and practices, including training and education, that not
only accommodate but make the most of them. If
employees’ decisions are not significantly influenced by
the ‘team’, cultural norms or a shared climate of behaviour
(SN), as per our findings, then effective coercion and
compliance must be derived from elsewhere. It may well
be beneficial for the organisation under investigation to
consider enhancing team training around risk reporting and
group learning from incidents in order to instil a stronger
identity in relation to error reporting within the group.
It is tempting, of course, to be alarmed by the juxtapo-
sition of the word ‘selfish’ and the term ‘financial institu-
tion’. Cynics might well contend that the dominance of
purely selfish behaviour is among the last things such an
organisation needs. Not least amid the lingering effects of
the global financial crisis and with new scandals consis-
tently emerging to undermine the fight to regain public
trust, the knee-jerk response may well be a negative one.
Yet this need not be the case. As we have shown,
mapping the ethical behaviour of individuals within
financial institutions may allow that very same behaviour
to be exploited in a positive way. In essence, to promote the
reporting of risk events it is first necessary to grasp the
preconditions that make reporting more likely. By appre-
ciating why employees think as they do, and recognising
what drives their decisions, it should be possible to support
the characteristics of a high-error management climate,
thus strengthening the relationship between the employee
and their error management climate.
Limitations
The results of this study are constrained by a number of
factors, which at times provide evidence of a need for
future research in the area of risk reporting within the
financial services industry. Firstly, the use of a survey that
implements the TPB was chosen due to the limited time
offered to the research team within the employee’s work
environment. However, there may be a difference between
the use of intention as a measure of an employee’s per-
ceived likelihood of reporting a risk event and actually
reporting as outlined by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran
(2006) and Taylor and Curtis (2010). This is further
exacerbated by a lack of ability to directly query subjects
as to the exact number of past experiences they have in the
reporting of risk events and how these were treated by
management, as the host organisation was reluctant to
allow access of any kind should these questions be raised in
survey form. It is well known within the error management
literature (Van Dyck et al. 2005; Gronewold et al. 2013)
that past experiences in the reporting of errors, and how
these queries were treated, will affect the prevalence of
future reporting. Unfortunately, in this current study this
past experience baseline was not able to be captured;
however, it must be noted that the intention to report was
strong within the study with a mean response of 5.83 to the
dependent variable. The collection of the aforementioned
variables would have allowed for a more granular analysis
of the intention to act in the future, thus allowing for more
precise interventions to be determined.
Secondly, the importance of call centre employees to the
organisation should not be understated; however, the lack
of a professional body by which they can identify and
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group themselves may make the results less generalisable
to professions in which there is a strong sense of profes-
sional identity, i.e. accountancy (Taylor and Curtis 2010).
This may go some way to explain the lack of effect SN has
on this group of subjects in the work environment. In
addition, the call centre setting by its very nature makes the
generalisation of results more difficult as they are
renowned for high levels of ‘employee churn’ that makes
the process of staff development and learning more diffi-
cult to embed (Malhotra and Mukherjee 2004; Schlesinger
and Heskett (1991).
This may hamper an employee’s ability to learn and
understand the error management climate in which they
are immersed as colleagues around them may move
through the organisation regularly. This rapid turnover of
staff will undoubtedly make the task of creating and
developing a high-error management climate by the
organisation under investigation more difficult. However,
it should be noted that in this current study over half of
staff were employed by the organisations for 3 years;
nonetheless, this is not the case in all call centres. Thirdly,
the ability of our 2-module methodology to capture actual
prosocial behaviour whilst inferring error management
behaviour and ultimately ethical climate via the TPB is
not only innovative but provides a new methodological
direction for future investigations of error management.
Our choice of an adapted classic dictator game in order to
capture elements of deception was not taken lightly, this
experimental design is robust, but it is limited in its ability
to link behaviour to inferences as captured by Module 2—
the survey. In order to minimise subject bias in their
decision-making during the execution of the Module 1
experiment they must be guaranteed anonymity in their
decision-making. The importance of subjects’ making
decisions anonymously was postulated in Smith (1976)
and is standard experimental and ethical practice when
conducting the experimental games with an element of
cheating (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013). If we had
been able to link the decision-making of both modules at
the individual level our results could have probed the
existence of an intrinsic link between prosocial behaviour
and error management climate within the working envi-
ronment of the employees.
Future Research
The results of this current study highlight the scope for
future research in areas of error management climate as
applied to risk reporting within the financial services
industry. The recent influx of new regulations such as
Solvency II to govern the internal management and ulti-
mately measure the effectiveness of internal processes of
operational risk within financial organisations will act as a
catalyst to new studies. It should be noted that the financial
services industry is rather late to the table of formalised
internal risk reporting, with the healthcare and aviation
industries considered best practice in this area. Although
the consequences of catastrophic failures in these industries
are in no way comparable to that of the financial services
industry the ‘see something, say something’ mantra as
posited by ‘just culture’ in these industries is pertinent to
this current study and future research in financial services
risk reporting. Future research that provides an ability to
cross-compare not only the risk reporting systems of dif-
ferent industries but also different professions, types of
errors, and reporting behaviour within those industries, will
not only assist in identifying best practice but could lead to
real-world implementations of effective interventions
within the financial services industry. This concept of
cross-industry pollination of risk processes is not without
precedent, as the mandatory pre-flight cockpit checklist as
implemented in the aviation industry has recently been
successfully adapted by the World Health Organisation in
an attempt to reduce surgical errors.
This current study along with others that have preceded
it (Gronewold et al. 2013) suffers from an inability to
conduct a longitudinal study, in which interventions (e.g.
training, simulation) can be tested and retested for stability
and depreciation in effectiveness over time. Future studies
that have the ability to access a financial services organi-
sation and test the saliency of their error management
climate in situ over a prolonged period of time, whilst
observing behaviour in an ontological manner, will benefit
from capturing the development of norms (both seen and
unseen) within the work environment. Further, the ability
to compare the intention to report from those in the past has
reported risk events and those who haven’t would provide a
better understanding as to the effects of past experience of
the error management climate in future reporting. How-
ever, given the business sensitivity and confidentiality that
shrouds the financial services industry, the embedded nat-
ure of such an ontological study or a between-group
comparison may well be more difficult to implement in
reality.
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Appendix 1: Photographs of Experimental Setting
Each participant took an envelope out of this box ran-
domly. There was a 90/10 split between envelopes con-
taining eight £1 coins and envelopes containing four £1
coins and four chocolate coins (Fig. 3).
Each participant opened their chosen envelope, took out
the money and was then able to put chocolate coins in
before the envelope was resealed and placed in a second
box (Fig. 4).
Appendix 2: Subject Instruction Leaflet
Welcome to the experiment. In this experiment, you will be
able to earn money and send money to another call centre.
In the envelope experiment you will play with another
participant. You are in the role of the sender. You will pick
an envelope that either has £8 coins, or £4 coins and 4
chocolate coins. Nobody will be able to see whether you
received an envelope with £8 or £4. You will go to a room
and take whatever you like out of the envelope. Nobody
will be able to see what you take out and what will be left
in the envelope. You will take the money in a room where
nobody can observe what you do. You are the only person
from the subject pool who knows what envelope you took.
Neither the experimenter nor other participants are able to
track your decisions back to you individually.
We will put a box with chocolate coins next to the box
where you put the envelope in, after you have made your
decision of how much money you will send.
Now you will reseal and place the envelope into the box
situated beside the chocolate coins, and this will be sent to
the receiver who is a colleague in a sister call centre within
your organisation.
Your pay-off will be what you took out of the envelope
and the receiver’s pay-off will be what you left in the
envelope.
There is a probability of 2% that the true value of the
envelope at the time you received it will be revealed.
Please see the probabilities in the figure below.
Fig. 3 Box with envelopes
Fig. 4 Second box and chocolate coins
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Appendix 3: TPB Survey Construct Questions
Attitude
Intention
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
agree
Agree Agree to
some extent
Neither/
Nor
Disagree to
some extent
Disagree Strongly
disagree
I intend to report operational risk losses/events in the
next twelve weeks should they arise
h h h h h h h
I plan to report operational risk losses/events in the next
twelve weeks should they arise
h h h h h h h
I want to report operational risk losses/events in the next
twelve weeks should they arise
h h h h h h h
Overall, I think that reporting operational risk losses/events is…?
Very effective Effective Somewhat effective Neither/Nor Somewhat ineffective Ineffective Very ineffective
h h h h h h h
Very beneficial Beneficial Somewhat beneficial Neither/Nor Somewhat harmful Harmful Very harmful
h h h h h h h
Very wise Wise Somewhat wise Neither/Nor Somewhat foolish Foolish Very foolish
h h h h h h h
Subjective Norm
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
agree
Agree Agree to
some extent
Neither/
Nor
Disagree to
some extent
Disagree Strongly
disagree
Most people I know would report operational risk losses/
events
h h h h h h h
People that are important to me would think that I should
report operational risk losses/events
h h h h h h h
People that are important to me would approve of me
reporting operational risk losses/events
h h h h h h h
My colleagues think it is appropriate for me to report
operational risk losses/events
h h h h h h h
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Perceived Behavioural Control
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
agree
Agree Agree to some
extent
Neither/
Nor
Disagree to
some extent
Disagree Strongly
disagree
If I wanted to I could easily report operational
risk losses/events
h h h h h h h
For me to report operational risk losses/events is
easy
h h h h h h h
I have control over my choice to report
operational risk losses/events
h h h h h h h
To what extent would you say…?
Very
likely
Likely Somewhat
likely
Neither/
Nor
Somewhat
unlikely
Unlikely Very
unlikely
I would be able to report operational risk losses/events
should they arise
h h h h h h h
Uncertainty
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
agree
Agree Agree to
some extent
Neither/
Nor
Disagree to
some extent
Disagree Strongly
disagree
I am sure of my knowledge and understanding of what
operational risk losses/events are
h h h h h h h
I am aware of the correct reporting channels for the
reporting of operational risks losses/events
h h h h h h h
When you come across various risk losses/events how sure are you of what to choose to report as an operational risk loss/event? (Tick one only)
Very sure Sure Somewhat sure Neither/Nor Somewhat unsure Unsure Very unsure N/A
h h h h h h h h
Risk Integrity
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
agree
Agree Agree to
some extent
Neither/
Nor
Disagree to
some extent
Disagree Strongly
disagree
I would be prepared to invest a lot of effort in
operational risk reporting
h h h h h h h
I would like more information in order to understand my
institution’s operational risk policy
h h h h h h h
Having a good risk management track record is
important to me
h h h h h h h
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